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Abstract 
Looking more closely at the way people form expectations about the possible 
outcome of the election in their electoral district I will provide evidence for the first 
time that strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems with 
large districts magnitudes, such as in Portugal. Employing district-level data from 
1975-2002 I estimate that a party, who is expected to win no seat, will be 
strategically deserted on average by about 3 per cent of the voters. This number does 
systematically vary with the district magnitude of each district and is largest (> 4 per 
cent) in Portugal’s smallest electoral districts (e.g., Beja and Évora). Nevertheless 
even in Portugal’s largest electoral district, Lisbon, strategic voting can be observed 
to have a systematic impact on parties vote shares. 
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Relevance of Strategic Voting in Portugal  
Do voters in Portugal try to avoid wasting their vote on uncompetitive parties? The 
Portuguese electoral system is known to be one of the most disproportional PR list systems in 
Europe. Thus votes of large parts of the electorate are apparently cast for parties that do not 
gain representation in parliament. This has, of course, important implication for the 
responsiveness of the political system. The signal voters can send by casting their votes for 
particular parties might be seriously biased in the aggregate. Only certain parties will be able 
to influence both, agenda and the policy-making process in parliament and, therefore, are able 
to make transparent this signals. 
 Although we know that naively applying behavioral theories without reference to the 
institutional embeddedness of the act of voting is misconceived, for the case of Portugal it 
seems that most voters cast a sincere vote, i.e. they vote for their most preferred party. These 
voters seem to be motivated by expressive concerns, to make their votes counted instead of 
ensuring that their votes actually count. Conversely, strategic voters in Portugal trying to 
avoid wasting their vote cast their votes for another party than their most preferred one if they 
thus expect to be more likely to influence the outcome of the race in their electoral district. 
They make sure that their vote counts as opposed to being merely counted by casting a sincere 
vote. Even a small number of strategic voters in PR systems might have a large impact on the 
election outcome in their electoral district, though. Moreover, a small number of voters might 
also determine the fate of a particular coalition government. Thus studying strategic voting 
seems to be a priori relevant even in PR systems such as Portugal. 
 
The Incentive Structure 
What are the incentives that the electoral systems provides to voters to deviate from their 
most preferred party? In general, in PR systems even marginal parties have chances to gain 
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seats and to represent the opinions of their voters. Therefore such an electoral system does not 
provide strong incentives for marginal party supporters to cast a strategic vote. The 
comparative literature on electoral systems argues, going back at least to Leys (1959) and 
Sartori (1968), that the smaller the district magnitude is, i.e., the fewer seats are awarded at 
the electoral district level, the stronger the incentives to vote strategically. Although this 
hypothesis is developed to asses the incentives across a variety of electoral systems it should 
also apply to electoral systems that do not award the same number of seats at every electoral 
system. 
The electoral institutions in Portugal are particularly interesting in that regard. Since 
1975 the range of the district magnitude is rather wide. Across all 20 electoral districts and all 
elections between 1975 and 2002 the district magnitude ranges from a minimum of 3 
(Portalegre since 1985, Beja since 1999 and Évora since 2002) to a maximum of 58 (Lisbon 
in 1976). Given the Leys-Sartori conjecture is supported, we should expect to find more 
strategic voting the smaller the district magnitude is. Nevertheless, the literature claims that 
strategic voting supposedly fades out when district magnitude is greater than 5 because the 
informational requirements for voters become to high in order to realize the incentives that are 
provided in districts with a larg district magnitude (Cox 1997: 100, Cox and Shugart 1996, 
Sartori 1968: 279). Simply put, it is (too) difficult for voters to figure out which party is 
marginal. Thus they cannot systematically try to avoid wasting their vote. Evidence to support 
this claim stems from Japanese and Colombian district-level results (Cox 1997: Chapter 5, 
Cox and Shugart 1996) as well as electoral returns in Spanish districts (Cox 1997: 115-117, 
Gunther 1989). At first sight, this argument seems plausible. Nevertheless the question, then, 
is, why forming expectations suddenly does become so difficult that, according to this line of 
reasoning, one expects some strategic voting in districts with magnitude 4 but no longer in 
districts with district magnitude 6 and higher. 
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My argument will be that the literature does not provide sufficiently solid 
microfoundations for macro-level relationships between electoral system characteristics and 
implications of the nature of party systems, such as conditions under which certain parties are 
strategically deserted. In order to understand the influence of institutional incentives that are 
at work one has to look more closely at the decision–making process of voters.  
 
Microfoundation and the Role of Expectations 
Following the wasted-vote logic, strategic voters in Portugal vote for another party than their 
most preferred one if they thus expect to be more likely to influence the outcome of the race 
in their electoral district. Thus besides party preferences the main factor that proves to be 
important for an individual’s decision-making process are subjective expectations whether a 
vote for someone’s most preferred party will be wasted. If we are willing to assume that 
voters try to maximize their expected utility from voting than we can conceptualize the 
expected utility in the following way: Every voter derives a higher utility from voting for a 
particular party the more this party is preferred over any other party, assuming that this party 
gains a seat in the voter’s electoral district in the first place. However, without gaining any 
seat in the voters electoral district, the utility derived from a wasted vote for this party will be 
much smaller or even zero, if the voter is not expressively motivated.1 Since not all parties 
will necessarily gain a seat in the voter’s electoral district, the additional utility a voter derives 
from voting for a party that gains a seat in the voters electoral district is uncertain. Thus the 
expected utility a voter derives from voting for a party is the product of the utility, given that 
this party will gain at least a seat in the voters electoral district, weighted by the voter’s 
expectation that this party will actually gain at least a seat.  
                                                 
1 The voter could derive a non-zero utility from wasting the vote simply for expressive reasons, i.e., because he 
or she feels good about voting for (e.g., in order to build or maintain a firm political identification that simplifies 
the political realm) or against a particular party. 
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How do voters form these expectations? There are at least two processes. On the one 
hand, independent of which party is most preferred, the larger the district magnitude the lower 
the threshold for any party to gain seats and thus the higher their supporters expectation that 
their vote will not be wasted (Sartori 1968: 279). Consequently, voters should be more aware 
that they potentially waste their vote in smaller districts than in larger districts because parties 
and the media are more likely to highlight this effect in smaller than in larger districts.  
On the other hand, independent of the district magnitude of voters’ electoral district, 
even inattentive voters - as “cognitive misers” (Fiske and Taylor 1991) – are likely to employ 
heuristics, such as the electoral history heuristic (Gschwend 2004) to generate reasonable 
expectations whether their most preferred party is able to win a seat in their electoral district. 
Following the electoral history heuristic implies to infer from the rough coordinates of the 
competitive electoral landscape of previous elections to the upcoming election. Although the 
process of expectation formation is unobservable, this heuristic implies that voters’ 
expectation whether their most preferred party will gain a seat in their electoral district in the 
upcoming election should be much higher if this party has previously gained a seat in this 
district. The consequences of employing this heuristic to generate expectations is independent 
from characteristics of the electoral district. It should not be harder for voters in large districts 
than for voters in small districts since they only care about the prospects of their most 
preferred party. Thus contrary to the reasoning in the literature (Cox and Shugart 1996: 311; 
Cox 1997: 100) voters might even cast a strategic vote in large districts, given that they 
expect their most preferred party to not gain representation in their electoral district.  
To sum up, there is a process at the district level, which characterizes the nature of the 
district race. The potential for any vote to be wasted is a priori higher in districts with smaller 
than in districts with larger district magnitude. Thus, political parties and the media should be 
on average all the more motivated to make voters aware of the wasted-vote context in districts 
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the smaller district magnitudes is. Thus, this process facilitates voters to form clear 
expectations. Although the average voter might be more aware of the possibility to waste his 
or her vote, there is a second process at the individual-level. Voters have to asses whether 
their most preferred party will gain a seat in their electoral district in the upcoming election. 
Since both processes operate at different levels at the same time, they presumably interact. 
Because these processes are unobservable, I will focus on their observable 
implications at the district-level in order to derive hypotheses about their consequences for 
what is politically relevant: party vote shares. If voters expect their most preferred party to 
gain no seat they should desert this party and vote strategically for another party in order to 
avoid wasting their vote. Thus, above and beyond a normal level of support that one 
otherwise expects parties in danger of not winning representation should get punished by 
strategic desertion and loose votes on parties that are expected to gain seats. Moreover, both 
processes, which facilitate voters to form expectations about the possibility of wasting their 
vote on their most preferred party, should interact. Thus, parties in danger of not winning 
representation should get punished more by strategic desertion and consequently perform 
worse, the smaller the district magnitude is. Conversely, parties not in danger of losing 
representation will benefit from strategic voting in the such districts. In addition to the votes 
of their loyal supporters these parties are favored by strategic voters who try to avoid wasting 
their vote.  
 
Data, Measurement and Analysis 
Since I traced observable implications of the unobservable expectation formation process to 
the district-level to predict party vote shares I will use district level results for all parties from 
1975-2002 in order to test my hypotheses. 
[Table 1 about here] 
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Following the presumed logic laid out previously, voters can only form expectations about the 
possibility that their vote might be wasted if the party they prefer most has contested the same 
electoral district in the previous election. Thus my theory cannot predict party vote shares for 
the first election a party does contest a particular electoral district. Nevertheless, I will end up 
with N = 1477 cases of parties contesting one of 20 electoral districts. Even a party’s election 
result of the first time it did contest a particular district is relevant in two ways for my 
analysis, though.  
First, what would happen if voters do not care about forming expectation and try to 
avoid wasting their votes? They simply cast their votes for the party they favor most. The 
observational implication of this on the district level would be that party vote shares are 
predictable by past performances in that district. Thus, I take a party’s previous vote share in a 
given district as a measure of the normal vote baseline (NORMAL VOTE) a party could 
reasonably expect. Such a measure of the latent level of sincere party support is necessary to 
not falsely overestimate the effect of strategic voting for (or against) a party in a given 
district. At the same token, it is a very conservative measure since it assumes that everybody 
voted sincerely the last time. Thus this measure potentially underestimate the number of 
strategic votes. 
Second, in order to form an expectation whether a vote for the most preferred party is 
wasted a typical voter following the electoral history heuristic will look back at the previous 
election result. How many seats did a party get previously? The voter will be more likely to 
cast a strategic vote if her or his most preferred party did not get any seat the last time in a 
given district. Thus, in order to test the hypothesis that parties expected to be in danger of not 
winning representation should get deserted by strategic voters, we include a dummy variable 
(EXPECTATION) that scores ‘1’ in a given district if a party had gained no seat in the previous 
election in that district. The distribution of this variable across parties is as follows: 
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[Table 2 about here] 
There is considerable variance across parties. Apart from the 18 districts the AD did contest in 
1980 all parties in Portugal have at least once contested an electoral district without winning a 
single seat there before. Parties in such districts are likely to be strategically deserted at the 
next election by some of their supporters because they expect their vote to be wasted. 
Conversely, there are apparently several parties who never managed to win at least a single 
seat in an electoral district. The support of these parties should diminish over time, or their 
supporters derive a particular high utility, based on either expressive motifs or to secure side-
benefits (such as financial compensation), from wasting their vote on these parties. 
 In order to test the second hypothesis that parties in danger of not winning 
representation perform worse while parties who are expected to gain seats should benefit from 
strategic voting, the smaller the district magnitude is, one has to account for the size of the 
district magnitude (M) in the model. It is likely that the marginal impact of district magnitude 
M on party vote shares at the district level diminishes if M gets larger (Monroe and Rose, 
2002; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). Therefore I logistically transform the district magnitude 
(log(M)) to account for that. In order to test for the conditionality of the hypothesized strategic 
desertion effect a product term with EXPECTATION will be necessary. 
 Finally, I also include time fixed-effects (YEARS) into the model since I will combine 
party vote shares from all elections to be as encompassing as possible and, at the same time, 
without violating the unit homogeneity assumption for pooling data.  
The standard dependent variable in the literature, the effective number of parties, as an 
aggregate measure of the nature of district party competition, does not directly reflect my 
predictions, namely the amount of strategic voting that favors or penalizes certain parties. 
Thus, contrary to previous research, a more appropriate candidate of a dependent variable, Y, 
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is the district-level share of parties contesting a particular district. The general specification of 
the model is as follows: 
 
⋅+= 10 bbY  NORMALVOTE ⋅+⋅+ 32 )log( bMb EXPECTATION ⋅⋅+ )log(4 Mb EXPECTATION + YEARS e+  
 
If parties are expected to not gain any seat, i.e. if the EXPECTATION scores ‘one’ we get: 
 
⋅++= 130 )( bbbY  NORMAL VOTE 2(b+ )log()4 Mb ⋅+  + YEARS  e+
 
Table 3 shows the estimation OLS estimation results. All standard errors are clustered by 
party and electoral district to account for the non-independence in the data structure. 
 In order to evaluate the unconditional effect of expectations on the amount of strategic 
desertion of parties I first present the results of a restricted model, excluding the 
characteristics of the district magnitude. Not surprisingly, there is some kind of continuity 
when predicting a party’s vote share at the district level. At the electoral district level 
apparently the strength of a party in the previous election is a reliable predictor of future 
election results. On average a given party can rely on almost 90 percent of its previous 
support for the next election. 
Moreover, as expected the coefficient of EXPECTATION is negative. This indicates that 
parties in districts where they have not won any seat in the previous election are predicted to 
loose on average almost 3 per cent compared to those districts where their voters could expect 
the party to gain representation. Every party has die-hard supporters. Nevertheless above and 
beyond the normal vote baseline, these results indicate that on average 3 out of 100 of a 
party’s potential supporters behave strategically and desert their party if they expect their vote 
to be wasted. 
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The impact of strategic voting is also conditional on the size of the electoral district. 
The estimation results of the full model does make transparent the empirical evidence to 
support this claim. As expected, the interaction effect of EXPECTATION and district magnitude 
is significant. Thus the strategic desertion effect depends on the magnitude of the electoral 
district. In order to make transparent the conditionality and the size of this effect I calculate 
the causal effect of EXPECTATION depending on the district magnitude, i.e. 
Y(EXPECTATION = 1) - Y(EXPECTATION = 0) = )log(43 Mbb ⋅+  
Figure 1 makes transparent the conditionality of the strategic voting effect. The area between 
the confidence intervals is shaded. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
In Portugal’s smallest electoral districts we find that more than 4 out of 100 supporters of any 
given party desert this party if they expect their votes to be wasted. The share of strategic 
voters for any given party will diminish the larger the district magnitude gets. Nevertheless, 
even in Lisbon, the largest electoral district in Portugal with a district magnitude of 48 (at the 
moment), the model will predict an albeit small but systematic share of voters cast a strategic 
vote. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I provide evidence for the case of Portugal that despite weak institutional 
incentives, strategic voting is observable across all electoral districts. These incentives 
constrain an individual’s decision-making process. The argument I developed here is that 
institutional incentives have an impact on the way voters form expectations about the 
outcome of the upcoming election. These incentives get channeled through the district 
magnitude. The situation in small districts is consequently different from large districts. 
Nevertheless there is also a second process at work that has an impact on the way voters form 
 10
expectations. Parties expected to be in danger of not winning representation get punished by 
strategic desertion – less so the larger the district magnitude is. Overall, the model predicts 
that almost 3 percent of each party’s vote share is lost due to strategic voting if voters do not 
expect a party to win at least a single seat in that electoral district. This number is highest 
(over 4 per cent) in Portugal’s smallest electoral districts. Nevertheless in all existing electoral 
districts today the results indicate some non-trivial amount of loss due to strategic voting. 
Parties that are expected to win representation benefit from the strategic votes of those voters 
who try to avoid wasting their votes on their most preferred party. This study echoes in many 
respects results from a comparable study about strategic voting that was done using district-
level data from Finland (Gschwend, Stoiber und Günther 2004). It would be interesting to 
compare quantitative differences between the number of strategic voters in Finland and 
Portugal. I would expect to find lower shares of strategic voters in Portugal since all relevant 
actors, parties, the media and voters alike, presumably still learn how to deal with the 
institutional incentives offered by the system most effectively. Nevertheless, even if there is a 
particular learning process it is not clear whether it operates at the electoral district level or at 
the national level.  
A major alternative argument to the one proposed here would be if not the voters react 
strategically to the institutional incentives of the electoral system but merely the party elites. 
Strategic behavior of parties is all the more likely if, on the one hand, there are strong party 
organizations, firmly anchored in the Portuguese society, and, on the other hand, if voting 
behavior is easily predictable at the district level. While the latter seems to be the case, given 
the high coefficient of the normal vote baseline in the model, the former criterion seems not to 
hold yet. There is a proliferation of various parties, which come and go, rename themselves or 
coalesce with others. Clearly a more detailed study of party is needed in order to estimate the 
impact of strategic party behavior. Nevertheless, the amount of strategic voting estimated here 
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is a conservative estimate since strategic behavior of party elites, building pre-electoral 
coalitions in order to maximize their prospects of getting seats in a particular district, does 
pre-empt strategic behavior on side of the voters, since a vote for a pre-electoral coalition of 
parties is more likely not to be wasted.  
Finally, future research using survey data has to provide more evidence whether the 
proposed expectation formation process is valid and whether we get similar evidence about 
the amount of strategic voting. Besides Portugal and Finland, one has to expand this research 
design to analyze district-level data from Spain in order to provide evidence that - contrary to 
the common wisdom in the literature - we might also observe strategic voting in large 
districts. 
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Table 1: Number of electoral districts a party did contest 
Party 1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 
PS 20 20 20 2 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 1
FRS    18        
UEDS   18         
            
PPD+PPD/PSD 20 20 2 2 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
CDS+CDS-PP 20 20 2 2 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2
AD   18 18        
PPM 12 20   16  20 20  13 16 
            
CDU       20     
PCP-PEV        20 20 20 20 3
APU   20 20 20 20      
PCP 20 20          
MDP+MDP/CDE 20      20     
            
BE          20 19 
BE-UDP           1 4
UDP 10 19 20 20 17 20 20 2 20   
PSR   20 20 17 20 19 20 20   
            
PCTP/MRPP   20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 5
PCP-ML  14          
MRPP  20          
PDC – RIGHT  17 17 19 19 20 20     
MPT – RIGHT         5 20 19 
PPM-MPT – RIGHT         6   
PDA – RIGHT    6 3   11 3 1  
PNR – RIGHT           6 
PSN – RIGHT        19 13 15  
POUS – LEFT   5 20 20 20 7   6 8 
OCMLP – LEFT   5 5 13       
PRD – LEFT      20 20 20    
PCR – LEFT      17 17     
AOC – LEFT  18          
FEC – LEFT 12           
FER – LEFT        5    
FSP – LEFT 15 18          
LCI – LEFT 4 18          
LST – LEFT     19       
MES – LEFT 14 20          
PH – LEFT          7 18 
UDPSR – LEFT     3       
PRT – LEFT  4          
PT - ?    20        
PUP - ? 7           
PG – ?         8   
MUT – ?         4   
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Table 2: Crucial Districts across Parties 
 
PARTY 
# electoral districts party 
did won seat before 
# electoral districts party 
did not won seat before 
 
Sum 
AD 18 0 18 
APU 36 24 60 
BE 1 18 19 
CDS 51 53 104 
CDS-PP 17 23 40 
FSP 0 15 15 
LCI 0 4 4 
MES 0 14 14 
MPT 0 24 24 
OCMLP 0 10 10 
OCP 9 11 20 
PCP-PEV 19 41 60 
PCR 0 17 17 
PCTP/MRPP 0 160 160 
PDA 0 12 12 
PDC 0 92 92 
PH 0 7 7 
POUS 0 66 66 
PPD 17 3 20 
PPD/PSD 122 2 124 
PPM 0 97 97 
PRD 18 22 40 
PS 181 1 182 
PSN 1 27 28 
PSR 0 116 116 
UDP 4 124 128 
TOTAL 494 983 1,477 
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Table 3: Strategic Desertion of Party Vote Shares 
  Dependent Variable: Party Vote Shares 
  Restricted Model Full Model 
 Independent Variables Coeff. Std. Err. p-value Coeff. Std. Err. p-value 
1b  NORMAL VOTE 0.894 0.019 0.000 0.881 0.020 0.000 
2b  ln(M) ***   -0.009 0.004 0.026 
3b  EXPECTATION -0.027 0.008 0.000 -0.050 0.013 0.000 
4b  EXPECTATION x ln(M) ***   0.008 0.004 0.031 
 YEARS       
 1976 0.004 0.005 0.450 0.004 0.005 0.379 
 1979 -0.023 0.006 0.000 -0.023 0.006 0.000 
 1980 -0.001 0.003 0.765 -0.001 0.003 0.837 
 1983 0.001 0.005 0.858 0.001 0.005 0.886 
 1985 -0.019 0.003 0.000 -0.020 0.003 0.000 
 1987 -0.001 0.004 0.813 -0.001 0.004 0.743 
 1991 0.006 0.004 0.171 0.006 0.004 0.156 
 1995 -0.003 0.010 0.737 -0.003 0.010 0.730 
 1999 -0.001 0.004 0.874 -0.001 0.004 0.868 
 Constant 0.031 0.008 0.000 0.054 0.013 0.000 
 N 1477   1477   
 # Clusters 286   286   
 R-squared 0.905   0.906   
 Root MSE 0.051   0.051   
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Figure 1: The Conditionally of the Strategic Desertion Effect 
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